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On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court overturned precedent that would send 
reverberations throughout the world of campaign finance. Since the early 20th century, 
Congress had taken great steps in regulating federal campaigns through a variety of 
methods: limiting contributions so that the wealthy and special interest groups could not 
create a stranglehold on the electoral process; directives to moderate campaign spending 
for federal offices; and finally the requirement of full public disclosure of any and all 
campaign finances in hopes of providing education and fairness to the electoral process.1 
One of the biggest restrictive measures amidst the goals of legislative policy-making was 
the ban of corporate money in the involvement of federal elections. The case of Citizens 
United, Inc. v. Federal Election Committee2 not only overturned this century long 
precedent, but more importantly started a cascading effect that would bring more outside 
spending into federal elections than the country had ever seen before.  
This ruling has already produced serious implications in our country’s democratic 
electoral process, particularly at the federal level. Concerns have already been raised over 
Citizen’s allowance of corporate money in Congressional and Presidential elections. 
Looking at these issues and analyzing the effect of corporate money on the electoral 
process will help us, as citizens, decide how to act in creating a more fair and less 
financially dependent electoral system. Money continues to flood federal campaigns at an 
unprecedented rate as Super PACs (political action committees) and the wealthy elite 
                                                        
1 FEC, Introduction, THE FEC AND THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW, 
HTTP://WWW.FEC.GOV/PAGES/BROCHURES/FECFECA.SHTML#INTRODUCTION (last visited JAN. 20, 2012). 
 
2 Citizens United, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. --- (2010), 130 S. Ct. 876, 122 L.Ed. 2d 415. 
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control the means to play a monumental role in the election of Washington’s public 
officials. With the impending 2012 Presidential election, Citizens has transformed the 
campaign finance landscape in a variety of ways. I aim to explore how the Supreme 
Court came to the decision that they did in Citizens United, the effect this decision had on 
political action committees, look at the rise and effect of Super PACS on federal 
campaigns since Citizens, and explore issues like quid pro quo and donor anonymity that 
threaten the integrity of our electoral system.   
The history of corporate spending in political elections is a storied one that fits 
inside the evolution of a legal framework that involved legislative acts and the validation 
of these acts by the Supreme Court. Beginning in the early 1900s, corporate spending in 
federal elections came to a forefront with the passage of the Tillman Act of 19073. The 
act was drafted in response to the Presidential election of 1904 featuring Alton Parker and 
Theodore Roosevelt. After losing the election, Alton Parker publicly questioned whether 
Roosevelt had clandestinely financed his successful election through the direct 
contributions of life insurance companies.4 After the media substantiated these claims, 
Democratic Senator Ben Tillman introduced a bill that would prevent corporations from 
“making money contributions in connection with political elections” that had to do with 
federal races involving “Presidential and Vice Presidential victors or a Representative in 
Congress or any election by any state legislature of a United States Senator.”5 The act 
                                                        
3 18 U.S.C. § 610 (originally enacted 1907, 34 Stat. 864) 
4 Congress Watch Division, 12 Months After, PUBLIC CITIZEN (2011). It’s important to note that the 
Tillman Act was the initial establishment of the precedent that individuals had more leeway than 
corporations in influencing political campaigns, an issue that would later come to light in Citizens when 
corporations were defined as individual entities. 
5 Supra 3. Act was later incorporated into the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.  
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effectively marked the start of federal campaign finance law with the idea that this ban 
would limit the power and influence of big business on the political process and prevent 
the idea of business and politics engaging in a sort of quid pro quo.6 In 1947, Congress 
further clarified the prevention of corporate spending on elections with the Taft Hartley 
Act. This prevented labor unions and more importantly, corporations, from making 
expenditures and contributions to federal elections.7 The unions’ response came in the 
creation of political action committees (PACs), which acted as the channel for members 
of unions and corporations to donate money that would support specific political 
candidates.8 Federal campaign finance didn’t stop there, as the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1972 required the reporting of full campaign contributions and 
expenditures to the Clerk of the House, Secretary of the Senate and Comptroller General 
of the United States General Accounting Office (with the Justice Department responsible 
for prosecuting specific violations).9 It wasn’t until 1975 that Congress created the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enforce the FECA, whose duty as an independent 
regulatory agency involved the disclosure of campaign finance information through the 
enforcement of statutory provisions that limit certain contributions at the state and federal 
level.10 After more than 60 years of drafted legislation governing the practice of 
                                                        
6 See Adam Winkler, Other People’s Money; Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 
GEO. L.J. 871, 871 (2004).  
7 FEC, APPENDIX 4, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited JAN. 20, 2012). 
8 CQ PRESS, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., INTEREST GROUP POLITICS, (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. 
Loomis eds., 7TH ed. 2007). As Chapter 8 of Interest Group Politics points out, PACs were later legally 
legitimized into federal law through the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 
9 Supra at 7. 
10 FEC, FEC Mission and History, ABOUT THE FEC, http://www.fec.gov/info/mssion.shtml (last visited 
JAN. 20, 2012). 
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campaign finance, the Supreme Court involved itself in the FECA stipulations and the 
creations of PACs in 1976 with Buckley v. Valeo.11 
In 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act12 had passed a substantial number of 
amendments outlining more rules pertaining to federal elections and the regulation of 
campaign contributions. In 1975, New York Senator James L. Buckley joined former 
Presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy and other plaintiffs in bringing suit against 
Francis R. Valeo, who served as Secretary of the Senate and the ex officio member13 of 
the FEC. The statutes at issue had the following provisions: “ individual political 
contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an over-all 
annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent expenditures by individuals 
and groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" are limited to $1,000 a year; 
campaign spending by candidates for various federal offices and spending for national 
conventions by political parties are subject to prescribed limits14; contributions and 
expenditures above certain threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed15; a 
system for public funding of Presidential campaign activities established by Subtitle H of 
the Internal Revenue Code16; and a Federal Election Commission established to 
                                                        
11 Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
12 Federal Elections Campaign Act, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). 
13 FEC, Court Case Abstracts, LITIGATION (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_B.shtml#buckley. The Secretary of the Senate, Francis Valeo, and 
the Clerk of the House were designated non-voting, ex officio Commissioners of the FEC. They had this 
right because of the FECA amendments 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) that thereby designated someone as 
commissioner of the FEC stemming from their position within Congress.  
14 2 U.S.C. §441a (2011). 
15 2 U.S.C. §434 (2011). 
16 I.R.C. §9001-9042 (2011). 
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administer and enforce the legislation17.”18 The petitioners argued that these stipulations 
were in direct violation of the First Amendment freedom and equal protection principle 
and the right to freedom of association. Furthermore, they argued that the IRC Subtitle H 
was unconstitutional for two reasons. The first being that it violated the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process clause and the second purporting that the appointment clause precluded the 
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Commission by acting as a violation of the 
separation of powers clause. The court concluded their opinion by affirming the  
“individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public 
financing scheme”19. However, the limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent 
expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his 
personal funds were deemed constitutionally invalid. Lastly, the Court held that most of 
the powers conferred upon Federal Election Commission by the Act violated the 
"Officers of the United States," portion of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, and 
therefore could not be exercised by the Commission as presently constituted.20 The 
Supreme Court believed the limits enacted by the FECA of 1974 effectively stemmed the 
incoming tide of potential political corruption (quid pro quo). Nevertheless, it had 
important implications on political action committees as it refused to limit the 
establishment of PACs and made important clarifications on a PACs right to make 
independent expenditures.21 Buckley v. Valeo clarified the idea of issue advocacy, 
wherein a group or individual advocates for or against certain issues to the general public. 
                                                        
17 Formerly 2 U.S.C. §437 c(a) (1)(A-C)) 
18 Valeo 424 US at 46 (1976). 
19 Id. at 143 
20 Id. 
21 Supra note 8 at 185. 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The Court outlawed certain issue advocacy as overtly expressive vocabulary that 
included words like “vote for,” “elect,” and “support.” The stipulations surrounding the 
idea of issue advocacy and federal campaign elections would be at issue again in 1986 in 
the Supreme Court case FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc and would later serve 
as the basis for Citizens United.  
A corporation’s political expenditures and FECA stipulations from the 1970s 
came to the forefront when FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.22 came before 
the Supreme Court in 1986. At issue in the case was the non-profit corporation 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life and their decision to have a special election flyer printed. 
Located on the election publication was information entitled “Everything You Need to 
Vote for Pro-Life.”23 The pamphlet featured the pro-life, pro-abortion positions of state 
and federal candidates and included statements such as, “Vote pro-life,” and “No pro-life 
candidate can win in November without your vote in September.”24 Copies were left in 
public areas and were mailed out to both members and non-members alike. The FEC 
found this to be a violation of the FECA stipulation 2 U.S.C. §441b25, which prevented 
corporate spending in federal elections.  
                                                        
22 FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 13 (1st 
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
23 FEC, Court Case Abstracts, LITIGATION (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_FEC_K.shtml#fec_mcfl  
24 Supra note 21 
25 The court record refers to §441b(1) as § 316 of the FECA. §316 later evolved into 2 U.S.C. §441b. The 
exact wording of 441b defines labor organization as, “any organization of any kind, or any agency or 
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates 
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” Therefore, the FEC believed Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life, Inc to fall under this category.  
  8 
 After the case went through the District Court and Court of Appeals, it 
went before the Supreme Court. In a narrowly contested decision, the Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of MCFL (Massachusetts Citizen For Life) but did so in a very roundabout 
way. Although MCFL argued that their actions didn’t constitute those outlined under 
§441b’s definition of expenditure(s), the Court disagreed by saying that the statute 
“clearly confirms that §441b was meant to proscribe expenditures in connection with an 
election” and not specifically on behalf of a candidate or political committee.26 Therefore, 
the Court ruled that MCFL had violated §441b, but found this code to be unconstitutional 
to MCFL as it applied27. The unconstitutionality of  §441b arose because of its 
“infringe[ment] on protected speech without a compelling justification for such 
infringement,” 28 resulting in a direction violation of the First Amendment Free Speech 
clause. When the dust had settled, the Court had carved out a narrow exception29 to 
FECA’s ban on corporate political spending in dealing with nonprofit corporations, 
further examining the use of corporate expenditures in federal elections and reaffirming 
                                                        
26 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 238 (1986). 2 U.S.C.§ 441b (2) (2011) defines 441b (2) 
as follows: “For purposes of this section and section 79l (h) of title 15,[1] the term “contribution or 
expenditure” includes a contribution or expenditure, as those terms are defined in section 431 of this title, 
and also includes any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or 
any services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance 
with the applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any candidate, 
campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the offices 
referred to in this section or for any applicable electioneering communication…” 
27 Essentially, the two basic challenges made by plaintiffs to the Supreme Court are an as applied challenge 
and a facial challenge. As applied is usually considered the better choice because it seeks the invalidation 
of a law in regards to how it applies to the client’s case, whereas a facial challenge seeks the invalidation of 
a law in every instance. 
28 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 263 (1986).  
29 The MCFL exemption allows nonprofit corporations to ignore federal electioneering communication 
restrictions because of its lack of shareholders and the understanding it wont accept contributions from for-
profit corporations or unions. 
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the specifications pertaining to expressive or issue advocacy.30 The Supreme Court cast a 
wary eye on combining corporate money with politics, citing a need for the protection of 
the country’s electoral system from “the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate 
wealth.”31 
  While Buckley and MCFL dealt with campaign finance law at the federal 
level, the Court found itself being presented with campaign finance questions at the state 
level in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce32. In 1985, the nonprofit corporation 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce took steps to place a quarter-page political ad in the 
Grand Rapids Press that supported a specific candidate to fill a vacant seat in the 
Michigan House of Representatives.33 The Chamber sought to pay for this advertisement 
through funds derived from their General Treasury. Under Michigan federal campaign 
finance law, “corporations could make ‘independent expenditures’ only from a separate, 
segregated fund.”34 Knowing this was punishable under state law as a felony, Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce sought a Constitutional challenge(s) from the United States 
District Court on grounds that their First Amendment Right to Free Speech and Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourth Amendment were being violated by section 54(1)35 of the 
Michigan Campaign Finance Act. After decisions of the District Court and Court of 
                                                        
30 It’s important to note that the Court discussed issue advocacy through MCFL’s illegal usage of specific 
words like “vote for.” Citing conclusions previously reached by the Court in Buckley, Justice Brennan 
concluded that MCFL’s pamphlet constituted prohibited expenditures. These key issue advocacy words 
would later play a prominent role in the Citizens United ruling. 
31 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 257 (1986).  
32 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, (1990). 
33 Prescott M. Lassman, Breaching the Fortress Walls: Corporate Political Speech and Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 78 VA L.REV. 759-792, (1992) 
34 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 169.254-.255. (1976) 
35 Id., .254 Sec. 54(1), which states “a corporation, joint stock company, domestic dependent 
sovereign, or labor organization shall not make a contribution or expenditure or provide volunteer personal 
services that are excluded from the definition of a contribution pursuant to section 4(3)(a).”  
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Appeals, the case headed for the Supreme Court. In a six-to-three decision, the Court 
found the law to be narrowly tailored to appropriately demonstrating a compelling 
interest in preventing corruption of campaign finance at the state level. The Court agreed 
that expressed activity or advocacy on behalf of a candidate fell well within First 
Amendment rights with the Michigan statute burdening that activity. Therefore, the only 
way the Court could determine the Constitutionality of the statute was by deciding 
whether it “justified a compelling state interest” through a narrowly tailored channel.36 
The Supreme Court threw out the Chamber’s argument stating the statute was a violation 
of the Equal Protection clause. The Chamber believed that unincorporated associations or 
media associations were not mandated to comply with the same restrictions under§ 54(1) 
and were given preferential treatment to “similarly situated entities.”37 The Court 
disagreed by stating that the media had unique societal roles that excluded them from this 
restriction, and that the Michigan Chamber had to adhere because it was given legal 
advantages unincorporated associations were not. Justice Thurgood Marshall concluded 





36 Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. at 680 (1990). 




Therefore the Court held that political speech may be excluded based on a speaker’s 
identity, serving as an atypical approach to past First Amendment principles.  
 Ten years later, campaign finance again became a hot-button topic of 
conversation as the amount of campaign money being raised skyrocketed. Soft money is 
nonfederal money that falls outside the realm of FEC regulations. Soft money was being 
used to provide a competitive edge in tightly fought elections through the financing of 
“administrative and electioneering activities.”39 The usage of soft money in 
electioneering communications became law when a U.S. District Court in Virginia ruled 
in 1995 that the spending of soft money in regards to issue advocacy was acceptable 
under the caveat that the Buckley standard of not explicitly urging voters to do a 
particular thing would not be violated.40 This precedent was further established when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC“ that 
political parties were allowed to spend money on behalf of candidates without using hard 
money.”41 From these decisions, the use of soft money in the 1996 Presidential election 
between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole skyrocketed. Additionally, soft money was being 
used to fund electioneering communications in forty-four of the Congressional 
                                                        
38 Id. at 660. Supra note 33 at 779. The court chose to address campaign corruption of the “corrosive and 
distorting effect of aggregations of wealth” as opposed to an issue that seemed to clearly outline the topic 
of “whether corporate expenditures pose a danger to quid pro quo corruption in candidate elections.” 
Previous precedent served to hallmark financial corruption as quid pro quo.  
39 Paul S. Herrnson, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and Congressional Elections ” in Lawrence C. 
Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., (CQ Press, 2005), 107-135.  
40 FEC v. Christian Action Coalition, 894 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Va., 1995).  
41 Supra note 8 at 197. 
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elections.42 This culminated in the Democratic and Republican parties raising $495 
million in soft money for the 2000 elections.43 Finding this unacceptable, Senators 
Russell Feingold and John McCain began advocating for governmental intervention in 
preventing soft money from controlling federal elections. Their wish came to fruition 
when Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, also known as the 
McCain-Feingold Act.44 It outlawed the use of soft money by national parties or 
congressional campaign committees, pressuring national, state, and local party 
organizations to pay for electioneering communications with their hard money. 
Corporations and unions were excluded from using treasury money to broadcast 
campaign advertisements or participate in “electioneering communications” The only 
way for corporate influence to be dispersed in the political realm was by coordinating 
activities through the proper avenue of their Political Action Committees. Therefore, 
political action committees became even bigger players on the national stage of campaign 
finance. Corporations and now national parties alike had similar dependence on using 
PACs to get their political ideologies broadcast.   
 The BCRA Act’s constitutionality was challenged almost immediately as Senator 
Mitch McConnell brought suit against the FEC in the District Court of Columbia in 
McConnell v. FEC45. More than 80 plaintiffs joined the suit shortly thereafter, 




44 Pub.L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 2002, H.R. 2356 “The Act had three major 
components: a ban on soft money, increased contribution limits, and restrictions on issue advocacy 
advertising,” as Paul S. Herrnson explains in his article, “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and 
Congressional Elections.”  
45 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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Free Speech and Fifth Amendment equal protection rights of the Due Process clause. The 
District Court issued a ruling that extinguished the ban on soft money while upholding 
the restrictions that had been assigned to electioneering communications. Following the 
District Court’s decision, the case made its way to the Supreme Court. In a narrowly 
contested decision, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 to uphold the Constitutionality of key 
provisions of the BCRA. Once again, corporations and unions were prevented from 
making their presence felt through independent expenditures and soft money. The Court 
deduced that PACs provided corporations and unions a “constitutionally sufficient” 
avenue to participate in federal elections.46 Expounding on the same interest discussed in 
Buckley and Austin, the Court believed that there was sufficient interest in “preserving the 
integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and preserving the confidence of 
citizens in the government.”47 The Justices believed that all of these things were infringed 
upon when corporate money had the opportunity of making its presence felt in federal 
elections. When the book had shut on the McConnell case, it seemed like the future for 
corporate influence in the electoral process was dim at best. Ironically, it took just one 
case with an expanded scope to throw a curveball into campaign finance.  
 In January 2008, the wheels were set in motion for corporate spending to be 
unleashed in political elections. Citizens United was a non-profit corporation intent on 
distributing a ninety-minute documentary called Hillary: The Movie. The documentary 
was critical of Senator Hillary Clinton’s impending effort to win the Democratic 
nomination for the Presidency. A few problems arose from the non-profits intentions to 
                                                        
46 THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: BEYOND CITIZENS 
UNITED 3 (Monica Youn, 2011). 
47 Id. at 31. 
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release the movie. Namely, Citizens was in violation of McCain-Feingold’s ban on 
corporate funded independent expenditures. Citizens also intended to show the movie in 
the days leading up to the election and tried to get around this by making the movie 
accessible only through “video-on-demand.” Citizens knew both these things could 
potentially be a violation of 441(b), along with BCRA’s §201 and §311 disclosure 
requirements, and therefore sought “declaratory and injunctive relief.48” After bringing 
their case before the District Court, the District Court granted the FEC summary 
judgment. After deciding that the BCRA’s disclosure requirements were constitutional 
and 441(b) was constitutional as applied to Hillary using McConnell precedent, the Court 
asked both parties to file supplemental briefs to the Supreme Court addressing the facial 
validity of McConnell or Austin49. Citizens’ submitted brief to the Supreme Court took 
the form of an as applied challenge, believing it had a better chance of having 441(b) 
successfully overturned.50 In an unprecedented move, the Supreme Court pointed to 
Citizens’ brief at the District Court level and its facial challenge of Austin and instructed 
Citizens to challenge the 441(b) legislation as unconstitutional. Justice Roberts believed 
the distinction wasn’t so definite that it imprisoned a challenger from using one over the 
other. He added “[nothing] prevents the Court from considering certain remedies if those 
remedies are necessary to resolve a claim that has been preserved.”51 The stage had been 
                                                        
48 Citizens United, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 1, 2 (2010). 
 
49 Id. at 12. 
50 What made this interesting was that Citizens used the basis of a facial challenge in the District Court 
proceedings, yet when the case reached the Supreme Court they decided to instead change tactics and 
challenge 441(b) through an as applied. This was in large part at the Court’s encouragement.  
51 See FEC, 588 U.S. at 21. Justice Roberts also cited Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and 
Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1339 (2000) in further justifying court’s discretion of 
instructing appropriate response by quoting Fallon, “Once a case is brought, no general categorical line bars 
a court from making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly ‘as-applied’ cases” at 1327-1328. 
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set for the Court to issue a monumental decision that would overturn years of well-
established precedent.  
 In evaluating the Constitutionality of the claims Citizens had raised, namely 
independent expenditures, the Supreme Court looked at past campaign finance precedent 
that involved Buckley v. Valeo, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the BCRA of 
2002, and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. The Supreme Court’s decision to 
strike down limits on independent expenditures in Buckley was founded on the belief that 
“[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination….alleviates the dangers that 
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the 
candidate.”52 Having already explained the Court’s reasoning in Austin and McConnell 
earlier, the Citizens Court used Buckley’s line of reasoning. This was done to reevaluate 
the decisions handed down in both Austin and McConnell that were founded on 
governmental anti-corruption interest. The Court believed that two different lines of 
precedent had been established pertaining to the restrictions on one’s political speech, “a 
pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”53 Justice Kennedy believed 
that the precedent established in Buckley (or pre-Austin) was the more important of the 
two conflicting views, citing that independent expenditures could not be banned unless a 
substantial threat could be established between expenditures and political corruption. 
Using the basis of understanding that independent expenditures did not correlate to quid 
pro quo, Justice Kennedy examined cases culminating in McConnell to determine the 
                                                        
52 Federal Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. at 48, citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  
 
53 Federal Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. at 39.  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Court’s definition of what constituted corruption. He determined that along with “quid 
pro quo, dollars for political favors,” the Court had over many years expounded upon the 
definition to include “the appearance of undue influence.”54 The Citizens Court took issue 
with  “undue influence” being a characteristic of the government’s definition or interest 
in corruption and instead returned to the older definition specific to only quid pro quo. 
Justice Kennedy believed that the influence of one engaging in political activity didn’t 
create the appearance of quid pro quo. “The fact that speakers may have influence over or 
access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”55 With this 
deduction, the Court overruled precedent that had been established in Austin and part 
441(b) of McConnell by concluding, “Independent expenditures, including those made by 
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”56 The Court 
deduced that it was a violation of one’s First Amendment right to have their speech 
suppressed based solely on one’s corporate identity. In a tightly contested vote, The 
Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that corporations were now free to spend 
shareholder money on independent expenditures in an effort to advocate on behalf or 
against a specific candidate running for political office.  “The appearance of influence or 
access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”57 
 In the end, one’s first amendment right to free speech proved to be the deciding 
factor in the Court’s decision to allow corporations to involve their own finances in the 
electoral process. “The Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without 
                                                        
54 FEC 558 U.S. at 57. 
55 Id. at 50. 
56 Id. at 49. 
57 Id. at 51. 
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chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First 
Amendment.”58 Justice Kennedy also made a point in the majority opinion to discuss his 
belief that PACs didn’t serve as an appropriate enough channel for political speech to be 
heard. “A PAC is a separate association from the corporation and [they are] burdensome 
alternatives.”59 It was decided that for-profit corporations should have the same rights as 
human beings when it comes to an individual’s freedom to have their speech heard.60       
“Speech is an essential mechanism for democracy, for it is the means to hold officials 
accountable to the people.”61 With the possibility of spending endless amounts of cash 
from their treasury checkbook, electioneering communications became one of the most 
attractive ways for people to advertise their beliefs on why a certain candidate was the 
right or wrong choice for the job. It seemed only natural that the wealthy would have no 
problem giving, but these same people didn’t want their name or company directly 
associated with an ad that airs on television criticizing Senator _____ (fill in the blank). 
Corporations and unions now had the ability to influence the electoral process, and thanks 
to FECA’s PAC stipulation, just the machinery to do it for them.  
 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice 
Sotomayor, expressed his disagreement over the Court’s decision. From the beginning, he 
illustrated a real concern over the kind of effect the ruling could have on the electoral 
process. “The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions 
                                                        
58 Id. at 19.  
59 Id. at 28. 
60  As Burt Neuborne explains in his article, “An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges,” it’s ironic that 
the Court came to this conclusion a hundred years after Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906) defined 
for-profit corporations to fall outside the realm rights protected to human beings, like the Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination clause.  
61 Federal Election Comm’n 558 U.S. at 30.  
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across the Nation, [with] the path it has taken to reach its outcome, I fear, do damage to 
this institution.”62 Justice Stevens believed that the Court erred from the get-go, 
answering questions fundamental to campaign finance that the litigants didn’t even ask, a 
procedure he remarked was “unusual and inadvisable for a court.” 63 He concluded his 
displeasure over the questions the Justices chose to answer by summarizing, “Essentially, 
five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they changed 
the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law.”64 He also had a real 
problem with the Court influencing the challenge Citizens presented, pressuring them to 
issue a facial instead of an as applied. “The parties have advanced numerous ways to 
resolve this case that would facilitate electioneering by nonprofit advocacy corporations 
such as Citizens United without toppling statutes and precedents.” 65 Stevens completely 
disagreed with the majority opinion’s anticorruption interest, citing grounds that focused 
all too narrowly on just quid pro quo. “We have never suggested that such quid pro quo 
debts must take the form of outright vote buying or bribes.” He continued, “Rather [quid 
pro quo] encompass[es] the myriad ways in which outside parties may induce an 
officeholder to confer a legislative benefit in direct response to, or anticipation of, some 
outlay of money the parties have made or will make on behalf of the officeholder.” 66 
Finally, he pointed out the importance of the American people having confidence in the 
system our nation was founded upon. “A democracy cannot function effectively when its 
                                                        
62 Id. at 91.  
 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 93.  
65 Id. at 101. 
66 Id. at 149.  
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constituent members believe laws are being bought and sold.” 67 While Stevens displayed 
a great deal of validity in his disagreement over the ruling, it was all for naught as the 
damage had already been done.   
 In a poll conducted by the Washington Post after the ruling was handed down, 
“80 percent of Americans opposed the decision, including 65% who strongly opposed 
it.”68 Political analysts and campaign lawyers alike believed that the influence of outside 
interest groups would dwarf that of political parties.69 In an article featured in the 
American Bar Association journal, lobbyists expressed their concern over the ruling 
affecting not just that of the Presidency, but legislative and judicial elections as well.70 
Justice Stevens’ concern over citizens’ faltering confidence in the electoral process was a 
commonly expressed sentiment among many after the ruling. “The framers intended 
Congress to be “dependent upon the People alone.” But the private funding of public 
campaigns has bred within Congress a second, and conflicting, dependency.”71 The idea 
of the Court deeming money to be no different than political speech contributes to the 
ideology that corporate and wealthy voices alike will drown out those of the politically-
engaged lower and middle class. A system is needed that “forces politicians to pay 
attention to their constituents, not just their constituents who pay”, and the current post-
                                                        
67 Id. at 150.  
68 Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s decision on Campaign Financing, 
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html 
69 Debra Cassens Weiss, Swayed Judicial Races and Pushy Lobbyists: Analysis of Citizens United, ABA 




71 Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOSTON REVIEW (Sept/Oct 2010), 
http://bostonreview.net/BR35.5/lessig.php. 
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Citizens system of campaign finance is incapable of doing this because of its decision to 
combine “corporate personhood and money is speech into one decision.”72 Michael 
Beckel, a representative of the Center for Responsive Politics, commented on Citizen’s 
affect on campaign finance by stating, “For the first time, independent groups would be 
legally allowed to say pretty much whatever they want, whenever they want, with 
corporate money, union money or money from individuals.”73 The only thing left to do 
for political analysts, lobbyists, citizens, and candidates alike was to wait and see how the 
changes would affect the electoral system. 
 Two years after the controversial ruling, it’s incredible to see the amount of 
money being spent as independent expenditures flood federal elections. Millions of 
dollars are being spent on electioneering communications that openly advertise on behalf 
or against a candidate and their campaign. At the heart of it all are political action 
committees. PACs face a much easier road of navigating the channels of federal law that 
mandates how much money can be received and how it can be spent. By laying the 
foundation of how campaign finance evolved over the course of the 20th century, it’s now 
possible to explore the effects independent expenditures and PACs have had on federal 
elections. Before I do that, it’s important to understand the evolutionary framework of 




72 Jeanne Jeong, Democracy for Sale: An Ambivalent Analysis of Citizens United, THE COLLEGE HILL 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 2011), http://students.brown.edu/College_Hill_Independent/?p=6019. 
73 Thomas Ritter and Michael Beckel, Interview with Michael Beckel, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
(Oct. 11, 2011), EMAIL. 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FROM PACS TO SUPER PACS, THEIR EFFECT ON 2012 
 As previously mentioned, political action committees had been around long 
before Citizens United. Buckley v. Valeo had provided unions and corporations the ability 
to express their political speech through political action committees. Through the 1976 
FEC regulations, donors were restricted from giving more than $5,000 to a PAC.74 As 
elections continued to evolve, donors found a way around this requirement through 527 
non-profits, which were allowed to accept donations in excess of the $5,000 limit. A 527 
committee is defined as a “tax-exempt, private political organization that is created to 
engage in political activities” and to “influence the selection, nomination, election or 
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office.”75 527s 
dominated the campaign finance landscape in the early 2000s, causing soft money 
fundraising to skyrocket and leading many to believe the 527 was the vehicle of choice to 
influence elections.76 For a long time this held true, but that would all change shortly 
after the Citizens decision. Once the Citizens ruling had been handed down, many 
wondered how the Court’s decision on independent expenditures would affect PACs. It 
took less than two months for their question to be answered in the form of the case 
SpeechNow.org, et al v. Federal Election Commission.77 
 SpeechNow was an unincorporated nonprofit classified as a 527 under the 
Internal Revenue Code. Although the 527 had yet to perform specific actions, its leaders 
                                                        
74 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C). 
75 Diana Dwyre, 527s: The New Bad Guys of Campaign Finance, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 212 (Allan 
J. Cigler & Burdette A. Loomis eds., 2007).  
76 Id. at 84. 
77 SpeechNow.org v Federal Election Commission, No. 1:08-cv-00248-JR, 2010 U.S. App., at 13 
(WestLaw). 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had made future plans concerning fundraising and independent expenditures. With plans 
to accept donations in excess of $5,000 and run electioneering communications for the 
2010 midterms, SpeechNow’s President and Treasurer, David Keating, was concerned 
the organization’s actions would violate federal law. Keating and a few others asked the 
FEC to issue an advisory opinion to determine if they would have to register as a political 
action committee and if contributions made to the organization would be subject to 
regulations like §441.78 The FEC quickly ruled that SpeechNow would be considered a 
PAC and that contributions would be limited to federal PAC limits. Keating and four 
others then took the initiative to file a complaint in District Court requesting declaratory 
relief against the FEC. The only problem was that they had done so under 2 U.S.C. 
§437h, which provides that a “district court immediately shall certify all questions of 
constitutionality of the FECA Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit 
involved.” The only parties permissible under 2 U.S.C. to seek declaratory relief were the 
FEC, political parties, or individuals and SpeechNow constituted none of these. The only 
reason the court of appeals agreed to hear the case was because the plaintiffs had also 
taken the initiative to seek a preliminary injunction against the FEC from enforcing PAC 
limits on the contributions that SpeechNow planned on accepting. Therefore, the 
questions raised in the complaint combined with the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction 
were consolidated into a single case appearing before the court of appeals.  
 One of the first things the court of appeals sought to address was the federally 





precedent in dealing with contribution limits lay within their anti-corruption interest. Yet, 
the court of appeals cited Citizens in determining their ruling. Because Citizens had ruled 
that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create quid pro quo arrangements, 
“contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures cannot corrupt or 
create the appearance of corruption.”79  Therefore, the court of appeals ruled that it was a 
direct violation of First Amendment rights to limit contributions made to an independent 
expenditure group. While Citizens opened the door for corporations and unions to spend 
their own money on federal elections, it hadn’t effectively answered the question in 
regards to donating money to PACs. The court of appeals did as PACs could now legally 
accept contributions of any size from any donor. The creation of Super PACs was now 
complete, as Super PACs became known as independent expenditure only political action 
committees intent on raising and spending unlimited funds campaigning on behalf or 
against a candidate.  
 In just a few months, the structure of political action committees had completely 
changed. With the Citizens and SpeechNow rulings, an important distinction had now 
been made separating standard PACs from a new breed: independent-expenditure-only 
political action committees. While they could accept unlimited amounts of money, the 
two main requirements that remained in place were that of donor disclosure and a clear 
distinction of incoordination between the committee and the candidate.  As the court of 
appeals said in the Speechnow case, “[But] the public has an interest in knowing who is 
speaking about a candidate and who is funding that speech, no matter whether the 
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Federal Election Commission, 2010 U.S. App., at 14 (WestLaw). 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contributions were made towards administrative expenses or independent 
expenditures.”80  
Super PACs have let their presence be felt immediately in federal elections, most 
notably in the upcoming 2012 Presidential election. As prominent super PACs raise and 
spend more and more money, many serious implications arise from their participation. Is 
there an appropriate level of incoordination between Super PACs and candidates? Are 
donors, political action committees and non-profits like 401(c) 4’s and 527s 
circumventing disclosure requirements? These series of questions lead to even bigger 
discussions such as: are PACs making their presence felt in federal elections and does 
their presence inhibit our democratic electoral system? I want to explore all of these 
things and more in examining the effect of political action committees at the federal level 
in a post-Citizens United world. 
 When the Supreme Court in Citizens and the Court of Appeals in Speechnow 
made the decision to allow an unlimited amount of money to be donated to independent 
expenditure groups, they did so because they believed independent expenditures offered 
no threat to the government’s anti-corruption interest of preventing quid pro quo. I 
believe recent events surrounding Super PACs can lead one to question this belief. It’s 
important to look at how Super PACs are affecting politics and the impending 
Presidential election. The most obvious beneficiaries of the rulings and the actions by 
donors and Super PACs are the candidates themselves. Heading into next year’s 
November election, every major candidate in the GOP, as well as President Barack 
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Obama, has aligned themselves with a Super PAC. The major Super PACs supporting 
GOP candidates are as followed: Restore Our Future, supporting Mitt Romney; Winning 
our Future, supporting Newt Gingrich; The Red, White, and Blue fund, supporting Rick 
Santorum; and Endorse Liberty, supporting Ron Paul. Interestingly enough, one of the 
biggest opponents of the Citizens ruling was Barack Obama himself, stating shortly after 
the ruling, “This opens the floodgates for an unlimited amount of special interest money 
into our democracy, [this] gives the special interest lobbyists new leverage to spend 
millions on advertising to persuade elected officials to vote their way – or to punish those 
who don’t.”81 However, he recently changed course by publicly endorsing Super PAC 
Priorities USA, a move that proved to be controversial after his public disdain over the 
Citizens ruling. Below is a chart82 listing the five primary Super PACs endorsing the 
candidates I mentioned, how much money those Committees have raised, and the amount 
of money that’s been spent campaigning on behalf of or against another candidate. I think 






81 President Barack Obama, Weekly Address, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 23, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-vows-continue-standing-
special-interests-behalf-amer. The President went on to say it infringed upon our democratic process.  
82 This information comes from the Center for Responsive Politics, otherwise known as opensecrets.org. 
They study FEC filings that detail the money being raised and spent by Super PACS. All information in 
this graph comes from filings made at the beginning of March.  
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SUPER PAC   SUPPORTS  $ RAISED  $ spent on  
IND. Exp 
Restore Our Future  Mitt Romney   $36,797,202  $33,768,405 
Winning Our Future  Newt Gingrich  $13,114,797  $16,147,653 
Red, White, and Blue  Rick Santorum  $2,817,675  $5,820,757 





These five Super PACS have raised a combined $60,586,102 and spent $59,604,126 on 
independent expenditures. These Super PACS and the money they’ve raised make up 
only a fraction of committees filed with the FEC and the money that has so far been 
raised in this election cycle. As of March’s FEC filing, there were 364 groups filed as 
Super PACs and they had raised $130,353,017 while also spending $75,113,928 in the 
2012 election cycle.83 This figure only looks to rise as the GOP race continues to move 
closer to the choosing of a clearly defined candidate. It’s hard to put that number into 
historical context, as the only data to refer to for comparison’s sake is the money raised 
and spent by Super PACs in the 2010 midterm elections, which occurred after the 
Citizens and SpeechNow rulings. However, looking at limited data provided by the Center 
for Responsive Politics, it’s clear the amount of independent expenditures and 
                                                        
83 Data comes from opensecrets.org.  
OpenSecrets.org, SUPER PACS (Mar. 25, 2011, 10:50 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012. 
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electioneering communications being raised are at a far greater rate than history’s ever 
seen before. 
 The data provided below marks outside spending through April 9th of the election 
years of 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012.84 This outside spending excludes candidate and 
party committee fundraising numbers. The reason I included years in which the 
Presidential election is not going on is to show how much outside spending has 
exponentially risen in federal elections, especially since the post-Citizens United ruling. 
 
OUTSIDE SPENDING THROUGH APRIL 9TH OF ELECTION YEAR 
Year  2006  2008  2010  2012 
Independent 
Expenditures 
$1,725,268  $23,337,391  $15,393,102  $93,545,491 
Electioneering 
Communications 
$466,200  $8,809,647  $3,129,614  $4,704,660 
Communication 
Costs 
$168,256  $11,976,076  $499,495  $88,989 
Total  $2,359,724  $44,123,114  $19,022,211  $98,339,140 
 
While the money raised in 2010 wasn’t as high because of the many months left 
preceding the midterm election, almost every subcategory of outside spending so far in 
the 2012 cycle dwarfs the 2010 cycle through April. This also doesn’t take into account 
                                                        
84 OpenSecrets.org, Outside Spending Through April 9th of Election Year, Excluding Party Committees, 
OUTSIDE SPENDING (Apr. 9, 2012 1:45 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php?cycle=2012&view=Y&chart=N#viewpt.  
This data is updated daily, so the numbers will be bigger than the ones listed above.  
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factors like an undecided GOP race, midterm elections, and the potential for party 
majority in Congress. As all of these things draw near, the amount of outside spending is 
certain to go to unprecedented levels unlike anything our country has seen in campaign 
finance. As I continue to explore the effect of Super PACs, I want to examine some 
important details. I want to take a closer look at the Super PACs I listed in my chart by 
exploring the people running them, some of the largest donors to these PACs, and 
implications these have had on the race for the Republican nomination for the Presidency. 
One of the most interesting aspects about Super PACs roles in the Presidential 
election thus far are the men behind them and their relationship to specific candidates.  
As I mentioned previously, the Court of Appeals ruling largely hinged on a level of 
incoordination clearly existing between a political action committee and the candidate it 
supported. This caveat is already being put to the test as many of the GOP candidates and 
President Obama have connections to the Super PACs supporting them in more ways 
than one. Friends, former colleagues, or in rare instances even family members sit atop 
powerful political action committees that play an integral role in helping a candidate get 
their message out to the American people. Mitt Romney made headlines by speaking at a 
Restore Our Future fundraising event85 in July, an act that the FEC deemed to be legal. It 
seems that the only unacceptable level of interaction between a candidate and their Super 
PAC is direct communication with one another, an action that seems extremely difficult 
                                                        







to prove. Below is a chart explaining some of the key figures behind specific Super PACs 
and the relationship these men and women have had to candidates.86 
 
 
This close association between a candidate and the people running the PAC supporting 
that candidate raises serious implications. It allows the candidate to feel comfortable 
having someone do the dirty work of raising and spending money on electioneering 
communications that advance their political message. It is true that men and women have 
long been hired to raise and spend money in the political realm. However, I see one 
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notable difference with Super PAC leaders in this new era of campaign finance and 
people hired to raise money by candidates or committees in the past. The Super PAC 
vehicle and those driving are now more powerful than the candidate and his/her 
fundraising teams. Rick Tyler and Carl Forti are two men that know what Newt Gingrich 
and Mitt Romney believe in and what their political ideologies are having worked with 
the candidates on previous campaigns. Why work for these two candidates directly when 
Mr. Forti or Mr. Tyler can have a much greater impact on political activity with a Super 
PAC? While many would view this as an advantage for the candidate to be able to sit 
back and watch a committee do their work for them, it can be argued that this could 
potentially have detrimental affects on the public’s perception of the candidate as well. If 
a candidate aligns his or herself too closely with a Super PAC and that PAC makes 
claims that are ultimately false or perceived in a negative light, there is a chance this 
negative perception could be transferred to the candidate.87 This happened recently when 
one of Rick Santorum’s biggest Red, White, and Blue donors, Foster Friess, made 
controversial statements about birth control. Friess has contributed hundreds of thousands 
of dollars to Santorum’s super PAC and offered to continue donating as much money as 
the PAC needed to stay afloat in the GOP race. Santorum, when asked about Friess’s 
comments responded, “This is someone who is a supporter of mine, and I’m not 
                                                        
87 Romney was criticized when Restore Our Future ran an ad attacking Newt Gingrich that contained 
inaccurate statements involving Gingrich’s voting record with Nancy Pelosi. When media uncovered this, 
many blamed Romney for allowing Restore Our Future to run the ad. One can argue he was not at fault 
when he has no control over what is said in advertisements and who runs them.  
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responsible for every comment that a supporter of mine makes.” 88 He further remarked it 
was “not reflective of me or my record on this issue.”  
 I believe the line is being skirted too closely for the American people not to fear 
quid pro quo rising up out of the framework of super PACS and candidates. When a 
candidate like Rick Santorum is traveling the country with arguably his Super PAC’s 
biggest donor, Foster Friess, and Mr. Friess is introducing him at fundraising events, I 
think the average voter should feel uncomfortable over the possibility of future quid pro 
quo.89 Also, FEC filings of recent Super PAC’s receipts have raised quid pro quo 
questions as well. For example, in the late January FEC filing of the Red, White, and 
Blue fund, receipts showed half a million dollars were spent paying a direct mail firm 
created by none other than Nick Ryan. Nick Ryan is a former Santorum aide and founder 
of the Red, White, and Blue Super PAC. “People who are raising the money are paying 
themselves with these funds, [something] I don’t think that’s appropriate,” said Dale 
Emmons, president of the American Association of Political Consultants.90 Other Super 
PACs receipts reveal interesting spending habits as well. Winning Our Future, the pro-
Newt Gingrich Super PAC, paid the President of the committee, Becky Burkett, $206,000 
in January for “executive management and fundraising services.”91 When asked about 
this, Winning our Future spokesperson Rick Tyler defended the Committee’s actions 
                                                        
88 Tim Mak, Rick Santorum Disavows Foster Friess’ Comments, POLITICO (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73020.html.  
89 Friess even introduced Santorum at the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington.  
Jennifer Rubin, Meet Foster Friess, Rick Santorum’s Super PAC Patron, WASHINGTON POST OPINIONS, 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/meet-foster-friess-rick-santorums-
super-pac-patron/2012/02/11/gIQAJgZO9Q_blog.html.  
90 Melanie Mason & Matea Gold, ‘Super PAC’ Leaders Profit From Lack of Oversight, L.A. TIMES, (Feb. 
22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/22/nation/la-na-superpac-spending-20120223.  
91 Id.  
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saying the payment was based on “fundraising successes” and that salaries of committee 
employees were determined by himself, Burkett, and managing director Gregg Phillips. 
This leaves an uneasy feeling in how transparent Super PACs really are even when 
disclosure requirements are mandated. 
 While PACs are raising millions of dollars and being operated by friends and 
former colleagues of candidates, Fred Wertheimer argues that, “Super PACs allow 
relatively few super-rich individuals to have greatly magnified and undue influence over 
the result of our elections.”92 The man who is known as being “the country’s leading 
proponent of campaign finance reform,93” Wertheimer runs Democracy 21, one of the 
most well known watchdog groups that advocate on behalf of campaign finance reform. 
Using data listed in a New York Times Article94, the chart below lists the five major 
Super PACs and their biggest donors. The data comes from the FEC filings released in 







92 Fred Wertheimer, Super PACs a Disaster for Democracy, CNN OPINION (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/opinion/wertheimer-super-pacs/index.html.   
93 New York Times said this about Fred Wertheimer. He’s also been called “a godfather of the campaign 
finance reform movement” by Time magazine. 





 First, the most interesting statistic is the percentage of large donors. Large donors 
are categorized as people whose donation exceeds $25,000.With every PAC receiving 
more than 90% of its donation in $25,000 or more donations, it’s easy to see why some 
people believe wealthy elitists are the only ones taking advantage of avenues that reflect 
undue influence over the electoral system. In the particular case of the GOP race, some 
political analysts believe that the backing of wealthy donors has allowed some candidates 
to stay in the race longer than they ordinarily would have in the pre-Super PAC era. This 













































their own money on the advancement of their political agenda because Super PACs now 
do that for them. When Sheldon and Miriam Adelson give Winning Our Future a $10 
million dollar donation, it allows Newt Gingrich less urgency in raising the necessary 
cash for competitive advantages like electioneering communications. As Mitt Romney’s 
lead in the race to acquire the 1,144 delegates needed to win the party nomination 
continues to increase, Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum find themselves more 
dependent than ever on the cash their Super PACs are willing to spend on their behalf. If 
Sheldon Adelson or Foster Friess decide to stop giving money to Gingrich or Santorum 
Super PACs, that could spell doom for the candidates Presidential aspirations. It’s also 
interesting to note that of the three major GOP candidates, Mitt Romney’s Super PAC not 
only has raised the most money, but also has the most million dollar contributions. 
Restore our Future has had twelve different contributions of one million dollars each. 
Rick Santorum’s Red, White, and Blue fund has had three different one million dollar 
donations made to it, while Gingrich’s Winning Our Future has had two separate one 
million dollar donations.95 Once again this reinforces the idea that Super PACs are 
primarily a tool for the rich and their political voice to be heard.  
 While I believe the data reinforces the idea that the majority of Super PAC 
donations come from the wealthy, that doesn’t preclude anyone from creating their own 
Super PAC. It’s an easy and relative painstakingly free process. Just ask Stephen Colbert. 
Colbert, the host of the popular Comedy Central show, The Colbert Report, detailed how 
easy it is for one to form their own Super PAC while also shrouding the committee and 
                                                        
95 Phil Hirschkorn, Super PAC Donors by the Numbers, CBSNEWS POLITICAL HOTSHEET (Mar. 22, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57402073-503544/super-pac-donors-by-the-numbers/.  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its donors in a veil of secrecy. After filing a one-page letter to the FEC chronicling it’s 
intentions to raise and spend an unlimited amount of independent expenditures, Colbert’s 
Super PAC, entitled “Americans for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow,” quickly raised over 
one million in contributions.96 Colbert’s self-deprecating attempt at mocking the current 
FEC regulations gained him many laughs, but more importantly it showed Americans 
how inherently flawed the whole system was.  After submitting the one page report to the 
FEC and the FEC acknowledging its existence, a PAC then has to follow disclosure 
requirements when filing subsequent donor receipts with the FEC. Colbert showed how 
easily one could circumvent this problem through the creation of a 501(c) 4. A 501(c) 4 is 
a tax-exempt nonprofit organization founded upon the idea of promoting or furthering 
social welfare. These organizations have become commonplace in the world of political 
lobbying because of a nifty rule that allows the nonprofit to bypass disclosure 
requirements to the FEC as long as a few basic guidelines are followed. For example, 
501(c)’s cannot participate in expressive advocacy or electioneering communications 
unless registered “specifically as independent expenditure or electioneering 
communication nonprofits, where they are subject to disclosure requirements.”97 
However, if 501 (c)’s are not clearly defined as independent expenditure or 
communication nonprofits, they do not have to publically disclose donor information to 
the IRS.98 Therefore, as long as rules are followed donor information is exempt from 
public intrusion. Using this avenue, money can then be transferred from the 501(c) 4 to 
                                                        
96 Sarah Maslin Nir, Colbert’s Super PAC Raises More Than $1 Million, N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUS (Jan 31, 
2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/colberts-super-pac-raises-more-than-1-million-
dollars/.  
97 CONGRESS WATCH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, Permissible Political Activities of PACs and Non-Profit 
Organizations Under Federal Campaign Finance and Tax Laws (2004). 
98 Id. The donations are disclosed to the IRS, but these are not open to public records.  
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Super PACs so that the PAC can spend money on behalf of a candidate, and the lack of 
donor disclosure between the 501 and the FEC now applies to the PAC and the FEC.  
To me, the most troubling thing about the current framework of campaign finance 
is the potential for donor anonymity. In a study released by two advocacy groups, 6.4% 
of contributions to PACS since 2010 could not be traced to the original source.99 Multiple 
incidents have already shown how prevalent the possibility for donor anonymity in the 
2012 election cycle could really be. Mitt Romney’s Restore Our Future has twice come 
under fire for accepting donations shrouded with secrecy that left media outlets and the 
American public alike scrambling to trace the money to the correct source. In April, a one 
million dollar contribution was made to Restore Our Future from the corporation W 
Spann LLC. After NBC news journalists began investigating the donation, information 
revealed that the company was founded a month before giving the money and dissolved 
shortly thereafter.100 The address of the company was listed as being located in a high-
rise building in downtown Manhattan. The only problem was that no such company 
existed at address 590 Madison Avenue, 42nd floor. After Restore Our Future caught 
considerable flak for the donation, Edward Conard stepped forward as the donor. The 
former colleague of Romney’s worked with him at Bain Capital, a huge private equity 
investment firm Mitt Romney helped co-found in 1984. It was believed that Conard 
stepped forward after an exorbant amount of public pressure was placed upon Restore 
Our Future to disclose the true identity of the W Spann donation. Shortly after the FEC 
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Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, AUCTIONEERING DEMOCRACY: THE RISE OF SUPER PACS & THE 2012 
ELECTION 6 (Dēmos & U.S. PIRG eds., 2012).  
100 Michael Isikoff, Mystery Million-Dollar Donor Revealed, NBC NEWS 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filings were released January 31st, the New York Times blog, The Caucus, began combing 
over Super PAC records that involved a few mysterious donors. Many of the mysterious 
donations were made through limited liability companies that appeared to exist only on 
paper, much like W Spann LLC did.101 One donation in particular made national 
headlines when The Caucus put out an ad asking readers to help them solve the 
mysterious donation from Glenbrook LLC.102 The limited liability company based out of 
California had given a $250,000 donation to Restore Our Future in August. The address 
given by the company was to an office suit occupied by a public accounting firm called 
Seiler L.L.P. Four days after The Caucus put out a plea for help, the mystery was solved 
as Restore Our Future amended their filing for the $250,000 donation from Glenbrook 
LLC to two separate $125,000 donations from Jesse and Melinda Rogers.103 It was 
discovered that Jesse Rogers was a former executive at Bain and Company. Mitt Romney 
had worked for Bain and Company before starting Bain Capital. He returned in the 1990s 
to help save the firm from financial collapse. Like the W Spann LLC donation, this once 
again raised the question why individuals were feeling the need to create “shell” 
companies to hide behind when participating in political advocacy? These corporations 
like W Spann and Glenbrook LLC exist for the sole purpose of being the curtain behind 
which donors hide. 
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If it’s easier for wealthy people to create a phony corporation to hide their 
political activity, what is preventing foreign donations from joining the fray of United 
States elections? In a system of campaign finance that offers many methods of 
circumvention, money from overseas governments or companies serve as a legitimate 
concern to both FEC officials and the United States government. The prevention of 
political contributions and expenditures from foreign nationals has been a law since 
1966104, yet avenues like the money exchange between Super PACs and 501(c)4’s are 
making this almost impossible to monitor. Trevor Potter, head of the Campaign Legal 
Center and former chairmen of the FEC, was recently quoted as saying, “Clearly, it is 
more difficult to enforce the ban on foreign spending when the source of the money is not 
publicly disclosed.”105 The 1966 law was reinforced by the Supreme Court in their 
January ruling of Bluman, et al., v. Federal Election Commission106, nonetheless an 
incident of this nature has since proved danger does exist. In February, Rick Santorum’s 
Super PAC, The Red, White, and Blue Fund, publically admitted to returning a $50,000 
donation that came from a foreign source.107 The source was Liquid Capital Markets Ltd., 
a London based equity firm. Red, White and Blue Fund’s confusion lay within their 
belief that the donation was made from an American executive within the firm. It was 
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their belief the money came out of this American executive’s pocket, whereas in actuality 
it came from the firm’s accounts. “The new reality presented by the decision in Citizen 
United and the rise of the Super PACs raises concerns about the challenge of discovering 
such illegal activity [foreign contributions], said FEC commissioner Cynthia L. 
Bauerly.108  
 
ARE SUPER PACS REALLY TO BLAME? 
 As Super PACs take middle stage amid the chaos of election season, one of the 
biggest arguments between campaign finance pundits is whether or not Super PACs are 
to blame for the host of problems that pervade the campaign finance world. As legal 
analyst Dan Abrams has explained109, individuals have been able to spend unlimited 
amounts of money on behalf of candidates since Buckley v. Valeo. It’s also true that 
before Super PACs existed, 527 organizations had the capability of accepting an 
unlimited amount of contributions from individuals, labor unions, and corporations alike.  
If individuals have always raised money and 527s have influenced elections with 
stealth and FEC circumvention, why are Super PACs such a big deal? To begin, 
individuals spending an unlimited amount of their own money in the past had to be done 
so directly. It could not be given to the proper conduit because limitations existed on all 
of them (party committees, candidate, and political action committees). Therefore, it was 
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109 Dan Abrams, The Media’s Shameful, Inexcusable Distortion of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United 
Decision, COLUMNISTS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.mediaite.com/online/the-medias-shameful-inexcusable-
distortion-of-the-supreme-courts-citizens-united-decision/.  
  40 
highly unlikely that individuals were willing to contribute both the time and the effort 
afforded to seeing huge amounts of their money spent on political advocacy. This is 
where Super PACs have played such a prominent role. They provide the perfect outlet for 
individuals to see their money spent for them without doing anything more than writing a 
dollar amount on a check bearing their name. While 527s catered to this same principle, 
they did so with a few stricter guidelines than the ones that pertain to Super PACs. 
Whereas Super PACs have no restrictions preventing them from expressively advocating 
for the election or defeat of a candidate, 527s are limited to engaging in issue advocacy 
only. This prevents them from expressively saying whom a voter should vote for or 
against. While it’s fair to argue that issue advocacy has the capability of being done as 
effectively as expressive advocacy, the creation of 527s also require a little bit more work 
than Super PACs. As Stephen Colbert has proved, the creation of a Super PAC is 
probably the easiest method for spending other people’s hard-earned money on the 
electoral process. While Super PACs are still in an infancy stage, the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals have left little room for their method of raising and spending money 
to be deemed illegal barring a complete overturn.  
 Therefore, I believe the answer to whether Super PACs are the ones to blame for 
the current state of disarray in campaign finance is a yes and no. The evolution of soft 
money and in particular non-profit organizations like 501(c)4’s and 527s have 
substantially contributed to the unprecedented levels of spending we see today. However, 
it was Citizens United and Speechnow.org that took spending to a whole new level and 
made it easy for a wealthy person to make their money and/or voice be heard. 
Electioneering communications are bombarding the average voter like never before and 
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Super PACs seem to be an extension of a candidate as their influence runs deep in 
television, on radio, and in campaign bank accounts. With a rise in spending, political 
coordination, donor anonymity, and the threat of influence outside of the American 
sphere, where does this leave what appears to be a broken system of campaign finance? 
 
 
CONCLUSION: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO REFORMING CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 
 How likely is it that the Supreme Court would reverse their decision-making in 
future proceedings involving unlimited donor independent expenditures or Super PACs? 
While I consider myself by no means an expert on the Supreme Court’s thought process, 
I think it would be difficult for a future Court comprised of different Justices to overturn 
the precedent that has been established in Citizens. At the heart of Citizens is a 
fundamental First Amendment freedom of speech issue. As Justice Kennedy says in his 
majority opinion, “The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and to 
create in the realm of thought and speech, [and] Citizens must be free to use new forms, 
and new forums, for the expression of ideas.”110 The current Supreme Court believes that 
the freedom of speech cannot justifiably be chilled by something such as independent 
expenditures because independent expenditures do not constitute a substantial enough 
threat to political corruption. A future Court will have to prove otherwise if Citizens is to 
be overturned. I don’t believe the Court understood the ramifications their decision would 
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have in regards to PACs. It will be interesting to see if the overabundance of political 
activity Super PACs have engaged in during this election cycle will create enough of a 
stir to eventually bring them before the Supreme Court. 
Even though, barring an unlikely reversal, groups will continue to have influence 
on political elections, it’s important to explore potential safety measures that could be 
utilized to limit problems like donor anonymity and potential PAC-candidate 
coordination. One possible solution is the recently introduced Disclose Act of 2012 or the 
“Disclosure of Information on Spending Campaign Leads to Open and Secure Elections 
of 2012.”111 Already introduced in the House of Representatives, the Disclose Act of 
2012 was recently brought before the Senate Rules Committee. The House and Senate 
Disclose bills have minor differences. Both bills call for a much greater sense of 
transparency in outside spending. The Act introduced in the House hopes to achieve this 
goal through a variety of regulations.112 The first is a call for enhancing public disclosure, 
which the Act proposes to achieve through ways like requiring outside spending groups 
such as corporations, committees, or individuals to report a donation in excess of $10,000 
to the FEC. This would help the FEC monitor interactions between non-profit 
organizations and Super PACs, as well as provide an easier way to keep an eye on what 
individuals are giving and to whom they are giving to.  The second important aspect of 
the Act is the desire to see corporations and outside spending groups standing by their 
advertisements. If Priorities USA puts out an ad attacking Republican candidate Mitt 
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Romney, it is expected to “approve of the message” being included in the ad. This 
guideline doesn’t exclude individuals classified as key donors as well. If one of the 
biggest donors like Sheldon Adelson wants to continue to contribute to Newt Gingrich, 
the Act would require his name to be disclosed to the American public in electioneering 
advertisements. From the corporate and labor union perspective, the Act calls for 
shareholder and member interests to be met through full disclosure of campaign-related 
expenditures. Going a step further, the Act also demands that companies and labor 
organizations provide a link to their political spending on corporate and union websites. 
If enacted, it would allow ordinary citizens to see where corporations/labor unions were 
spending money in the political sphere in a much more convenient and painstakingly free 
process. This would potentially eliminate phony shell corporations like Glenbrook LLC 
and W Spann LLC. The idea is to cut down on the paper trail that’s littering the campaign 
finance landscape, where New York Times writers are left to expose to the public 
questionable outside spending habits. Finally, the last major aspect of the bill calls for 
lobbyists to disclose outside spending habits in conjunction with their lobbying activities.  
 The Disclose Act and many of its principles were first envisioned shortly after the 
Citizens United ruling.  United States Representative Chris Van Hollen (D, Maryland) 
and Senator Charles Schumer (D, New York) were the faces behind the Disclose Act as 
Van Hollen introduced it to the House113 and Schumer to the Senate.114 In April of 2010, 
the Disclose Act of 2010 was introduced and by June had passed in the House. By July, 





Senate. The required mandate of 60 supporting senators fell short when the final tally was 
fifty-seven to forty-one. Senator Reid switched his vote from a yes to a no to preserve his 
right to bring back the bill in a motion for reconsideration. A few months later, the bill 
reappeared before the Senate resulting in the same outcome. The final vote was 59-39 as 
no Republicans offered to put their support behind the bill. Two years later, Senator 
Sheldon Whitehouse is now backing the modified bill as it appears once again before the 
Senate.   
 The disagreement between the two parties seems to be over the constitutionality 
of the bill. Republicans see it as an infringement upon one’s First Amendment rights 
while Democrats believe it’s a necessary safeguard against the ever-increasing risk of 
corruption in campaign spending. Republicans also see it as a desperate attempt by 
Democrats to minimize damage that will come from negative electioneering 
communications and longer, more-drawn out campaign battles. While Republicans long 
cried for transparency in federal elections, conservative groups like Karl Rove’s 
American Crossroads have cashed in as deep-pocketed Republicans have given millions 
of dollars to PACs. Meanwhile, the traditional Democratic opponents long against 
harsher disclosure requirements now find themselves scrambling to level the playing 
field.  
 The amount of outside spending and the avenues through which unidentifiable 
money can infiltrate the electoral system is a real threat to democracy. As Super PACs 
continue to gain power, the average voter’s ability to critically assess political candidates 
and their messages becomes more and more difficult. While money has and always will 
be a large part of being elected to political office, the erosion of the two basic principles 
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of contribution limits and disclosure requirements have left campaign finance in need of 
reform more than ever. By understanding how Citizens United and cases like Speechnow 
have changed the dynamics of fundraising for political candidates, it is my hope that 
people will be better equipped to handle the overabundance of undue influence that cloud 
our country’s electoral process. In order for that understanding to be put to good use, it’s 
up to the government to help citizens cast a light on the shadowy sources that are helping 
fund the election of public officials. I believe the Disclose Act would go a long way 
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